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CASE NOTES
Arbitration Award—Personal Service Contract.—Staklinski v. Pyramid
Electric Co.'—The parties entered into an employment contract whereby
the company hired Staklinski as its production manager 2 for eleven
years and two months. The agreement provided that if Staklinski
was substantially unable to perform his duties for three months, respond-
ent's board of directors was to decide if such disability was permanent or
temporary. If they found the disability to be permanent, Staklinski's serv-
ices could be terminated. The agreement further provided for arbitration
of all disputes. A year and eight months from the date of the agreement,
respondent's board of directors declared petitioner permanently disabled
and terminated his services. As a result of arbitration he was found sub-
stantially able to perform his duties and his reinstatement was directed.
The New York Supreme Court, Special Term, confirmed the award of the
arbitrators and denied a cross motion to vacate . 8 The Appellate Division
affirmed in a three to two decision' HELD: Under the arbitration statute
of New York8
 the court is obligated to confirm this award since none of
the grounds set forth in the statute warranting the vacating of such awards
existed here.8
 In prior cases New York courts have upheld arbitration
awards directing the reinstatement and retention of employees under col-
lective bargaining agreements."' This appears to be the first instance in
which a New York court has confirmed an award that directed the
performance of a personal service contract.
"As a .general rule, equity will not enforce specific performance of
contracts for personal services. The execution of such contracts depends
upon the skill, volition and fidelity of the person who has engaged to
perform them; and it is impracticable, if not impossible, for a court to
supervise their proper execution or to secure their faithful , performance."8
These reasons for, refusing to enforce personal service contracts becOme even
stronger when the employee has a 'position comparable to Staklinski's which
requires a high degree of skill and business judgment.
The statute, as construed by the court, has excised these consider-
ations from the court's discretion and obliged the court to confirm the
award directing Staklinski's reinstatement. As a result of this decision,
the court has assumed the task of supervising the execution of this contract.
1
 6 App. Div. 2d 565, 180 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st Dep't 1958).
2 Staklinski is the largest single stockholder in the company.
3 10 Misc. 2d 706, 172 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
4 6 App. Div. 2d 565, 180 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st Dep't 1958).
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act, Art. 84.
5 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act 1$ 1462 and 1462a.
Matter of Ruppert (Egelhofer), 3 N.Y.2d 576, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Ct. of App.
1958) ; Matter of Devery (Daniels & Kennedy, Inc.), 266 App. Div. 213, 41 N.Y.S.2d 293
(1st Dep't 1943), aff'd 292 N.Y. 596, 55, N.E.2d 370; Goldman v. Cohen, 222 App.
Div. 631, 227 N.Y.S. 311 (1st Dept 1928) ; United Culinary Bar and Grill Employees
v. Schiff man, 299 N.Y. 577, 86 N.E.2d 104 (1949).
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The statute, therefore, is, obliging the court to .assume a task that courts
have traditionally refused to lundertitke:':.
It is suggested that an amendment to the statute will eliminate this
undesirable result. The legislature' could adopt a 'statute similar. ' the
arbitration statute of Illinois• which expressly provides for -retention of
equitable jurisdiction by the court in the enforcement of awards .° A less
drastic approach would be to exempt awards directing personal service
from the requirement of obligatory confirmation. Such amendments would
allow the courts to use discretion in cases similar to the main' case and
thereby avoid the problems that arise when a court is obliged to confirm
such awards. 1°
PAUL V. KENNEALLY
Conditional Sales—Rescission by Purchaser Allowed Where Contract
Did Not Preciiely Conform to Statutory Standard.—Bratta v: Caruso
Car co,'—:-The plaintiff pUrchased a car from the defendant pursuant to a
ConditiOnal salei' contract purporting to be executed under' the provisions , of
the California Civil Code,' § '2982. 2 The contraet 'recited a $300 'cash down
paynent.  In,
 reality, the plaintiff had insufficient funds to meet the down
payment and, a promissory note for the amount was then' executed in faiior
of the defendant. The defendant referred the plaintiff to a' finance company
where he could 'obtain a $300' loan and make the specified cash' down pay-
ment. The plaintiff upon learning of the terms required by the' finance
company 3 refused' to negotiate the loan. He, therenpon; gavenotice Of re-
scission to the defendant who refused to agree to a'rescission, and whd; there-
after, repossessed . the ca•upOn the pWntiff's failure to Inake-the specified
payments. In a suit by the plaintiff for rescission the Superior Court, Los
Angeles County, held for the' defendant. On the plaintiff's appeal the
District Court of Appeals, Second District of California; reversed, holding
that since the purchaser 'did not make a cash payment of $300 "in 'cash"
as recited in the contract, but executed a' note in such amount,. the condi-
tional sale contract was -invalid under the California Civil Code, § 2982,
and the purchaser was entitled to rescind.
The decision is in accord with recent California cases holding that the
statute was enacted for the benefit of purchasers for the reason that they
are not in : purl delicto with sellers, and, therefore; conditional sale con-
tracts which do not 'strictly conform with the statutory provisionS are unen-
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 10, 4 13 (1457).
19 See 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 961 for a comment on the main case.,
1 333 P.2d 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).' • '•
2 The California Civil Code, 2982, provides in effect that an exact copy' of every
conditional 'sales contract shall be delivered by the seller to the buyer at ' the time of
execution and that certain items such as cash price, down payment, balance 'dtie, etc.,
shall be recited in the contract; moreover, the statute provides the exact order in which
each item is to appear. ', • '
' 3 In addition to having a lien imposed on his hro rtsehold furniture, • the plaintiff
would have bad to make 19 'Monthly payments of $25 'each.. In other words, he - would
have had to pay $475 for the privilege-of borrowing $300. • - ••
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